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Abstract
In architectural theory, the critical approach appeared in the
sixties blending the socio-political assessment of modernity and
the aesthetic evaluation of modernism in various proportions.
From this combination and partly to increase its effectiveness,
critical theory was more or less successfully, also put into prac-
tice. However, significant changes in the last two decades,
mainly due to the globalization of capitalism, undermined the
critical position in almost every field, and in particular the idea
of a critical architectural practice. Previously this as a counter-
point, was intended to be the device for the maintenance of dis-
ciplinarity against a commercialized mass architecture. Many
argue today that instead of criticism that is drawing the lines
the ‘freedom’ of pragmatism is more prominent in the architec-
tural discourse and design. However, this essay rather claims
that the struggle between the critical and pragmatist approach
no longer makes any sense and argues for a searching of values
and meaning in the ‘betweenness’ that is the topography of the
former poles.
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2 Disciplinarity as Criticality vs. Disciplinarity as
Pragmatism
After 2000, a rather odd trans-Atlantic debate began about
‘architectural criticality’ in the context of articles, conferences
and institutions prompted by a mainly younger generation of
architects who wanted to put practice in front of theoretical
agendas. They stated that although after the Second World War,
thanks to the spreading of modernity and its gathering speed,
criticism, as a potential intellectual position, was relevant; now
a different approach needs to be represented as global capital-
ism and liberal democracy is engorging all opponents, i.e. their
alternatives.1 Moreover, as we are now decades after the initial
impetus of global regime change, we see many things differ-
ently, and a number of conditions have changed (with perhaps
the common example of 9/11 as the most radical criticism).
The problem has become thoroughly chewed over; progres-
sively different intellectual connections leading increasingly fur-
ther away from the original goals have been established; unclear
meanings of notions have been proliferated, and intellectual re-
lations have been created in the magic circles of cloudy, partly
academic-authoritarian, myths. However if we look at the sub-
ject with a slightly wider perspective, we come to the question
as to whether or not to believe today that a building is more than
a product of culture industry and is still able to convey value
and create meaning. Then the debate is rather about this dis-
ciplinarity: about the nature of architecture between the con-
ceptual poles of a criticality to be superseded and a superseding
pragmatism which both blames and exploits the circumstances
of global capitalism. It is about what kind of possibilities and
ways does the realization of an architectural concept, even sup-
ported by theory, have. Or conversely, from the aspect of prac-
tice and construction, taking these permanently into account,
how can a concept be created that produces value and mean-
ing. The discourse, from this perspective, is taking place on
what tools are available for us, what is the role that we, as ar-
chitects, could play in the process, and what effect—if it occurs
at all—can the implementation of a ‘strong’ concept, or even
1This is ‘The end of history’, as Francis Fukuyama called it. (Macmillan,
New York, 1992)
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the discipline itself, have in other areas, such as the social, eco-
nomic or cultural levels. 2 It should be stressed, however, that
in this context even the most extreme practical approach does
not manage the building as a mere mass-product for the market,
while it is no longer driven by an underlying and lofty, more
general and total ideology, but by everyday parameters of which
the possible—the easy to control–greatest quantity is used, in
the most complex way.
The pragmatic approach, to put it very simply, considers the
critical position invalid because it cannot be an outsider of the
system, an opposed pair, a negative. Pragmatists suggest that
such criticism would not provide effective answers, and a two-
front battle is thus launched against it. Pragmatists declared,
on the one hand, that architectural theory is unnecessary as
the maintained domain of critical thinking, on the other hand,
that critical practice based on theory is inoperative although it
played a major role in the western architectural history of pre-
vious decades. Accordingly, the discourse has two poles and
several specific points of reference have been added to them:
defenders of criticality (e.g. K. Michael Hays) name their God-
father as Peter Eisenman, the attackers (e.g. Michael Speaks) as
Rem Koolhaas, and the individual readings are always located
somewhere in between.
1 Frames
As the New Yorker Eisenman stared at the sparkling, sophis-
ticated, critical intellectual life of Europe in amazement in the
early ’60s, so did the Dutch Koolhaas, partly introduced by
Eisenman, at the vital, stylish, effective American metropolis
in the ’70s. While Eisenman desired for more limitation, for the
real modernization of western architecture, for thinking about
‘post-modern’ metaphysics, historical continuity and notational
systems (let us call it disciplinarity), Koolhaas wanted to get rid
of (rigid historical) shackles, to ‘express himself’ in a differ-
ent way than a classical European auteur would do, to surf on
capital that is construction (let’s also call it disciplinarity to be
inconsistent with pragmatists). The cradle of both approaches,
as well as of architectural criticism, is the East Coast of the
USA, where the ANY conference-series, challenging and inves-
tigating disciplinarity from within, also started in the 90’s, and
including the Godfathers as protagonists.3 Although it would
be worthwhile to examine whether the continuation of critical
theory was spread and propagated all around the world by the
travelling conference, and in the other direction, to what extent
theory was transformed by multicultural influences, in the fol-
lowing we should rather focus on the various processes that ap-
peared and led towards pragmatism during ANY, as they explain
our problem in actuality.
The continuous dynamism of the economy going global oc-
curred naturally in the construction industry and created new
conditions for the practically ‘unemployed’ theorizing-teaching
2Cf. such effects of Bilbao Guggenheim to its region.
3See [3]
architects. The change, on the one hand required profession-
alism and efficiency on their part, and on the other, facing up
to complexity (and the control and regulation partly resulting
from it), to restructuring in the growing global market and in-
creasing the volume of buildings as mass products, as well as
to problems of the ‘second wave of modernization’ worldwide
connected to their everyday experiences. The critical theoreti-
cal (often aesthetic) considerations had to be complemented by
several other, more pragmatic parameters. Thus it became ap-
parent that both combining the deconstruction of architectural
theory with formal experimentation is extremely difficult (se-
mantically, financially, structurally, in communicating with the
client, etc.), and deconstructed buildings, intended to be criti-
cal previously, and since have become popular-spectacular prod-
ucts through their medial unusualness, end in failure. That is,
the most critical or most avant-garde architect is forced to join
the globalizing capitalist system. The Eisenmanian withdrawn-
oppositional approach which focused rather on the theory-based
creation process instead of the product is also not allowed to op-
erate in such circumstances, according to the pragmatists. How-
ever, in the meantime, one example of Michael Speaks is the
theorist Greg Lynn, who declaredly attempts to pursue and ful-
fil the poststructuralist experiments of Eisenman with the assis-
tance of digital devices.4 Another example is Koolhaas, who
worked ’unconsciously’ after returning home from America—
his Office for Metropolitan Architecture had so much work in
the prosperous context of nineties’ Holland, that there was no
time to theorize—but he established in 1999, exactly for this
reason, the architectural research unit called AMO associated
with the practical office.5 Hi (and his followers) goal was to be
able to deduce relevant ‘great truths’ from statistics charts, to
find their way around the chaos resulting from the lack of safety
contexts, i.e. the critical background, to justify their decisions
by these ’quasi-experiences’.
The architectural theory led by (the myth of) Eisenman was
fertilized the most by difference-philosophies with which, ac-
cording to the interdisciplinary approach, the boundaries of
the architectural territory can be defined by crossing its bor-
ders and then looking back to it from ‘outside’. The decon-
struction of Jacques Derrida had been previously used for this
purpose, or, more recently, the networked concepts of Gilles
Deleuze, who actually can be honoured with ‘the philosopher
of the nineties’ prize, also seem to be suitable to this deterri-
torialization. Contrary to mass society and its model of same-
ness, these critical theories claim that we are all different with
different thoughts and needs. The objectivity that had been as-
sumed by the general-totalizing ideological background is false,
so the criticism based on this is invalid too, and an immanent
personal or singular opinion may be stood instead of it. The so-
called factuality and universal relevance are passé, there is no
4Speaks, A+U (2003) no. 396, p 122.
5Speaks, A+U (2003) no. 389, 130.
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outside or otherness, the involvement is constant, no excuses: in
the anthropological sense, by defining the other I create myself
too, or, in literary terms, reading—as interpretation—generates
new, unique meanings. In other words, defining and continu-
ously positioning the boundaries of both the discipline itself and
the ‘critical architecture’ describes the interpreter and his con-
text at the same time: the method how the critical architecture
‘precluded capitalism’, and how the contemporary does not, or
only slightly, is essential to the disciplinary boundaries, to the
notion of architecture.
Based on these, criticizing both modern rationality and clarity
and the capitalist position that accepts only quantitative reports,
late-critical tendencies appeared in ANY. They were such ‘dirty
theories’ which—as opposed to the unequivocal rational sim-
plicity of modernism, minimalism or the capital itself—were
complex and contradictory, and worked with individual inter-
pretations, dynamic conceptual systems, fictive and interdisci-
plinary approaches. Besides Eisenman, the peak of this was
represented by the writings of Bernard Cache and Greg Lynn.6
The common feature was that though the theory partly dealt with
practical issues, i.e. the nature of design theory, it was rather in-
terested in a more general theme of disciplinarity that is building
elitist ideal concepts around difference and dirt.
In contrast, for the second half of the ’90s pragmatist
oeuvres—i.e. based on case studies—have been established,
which were supported by a quasi-theory if we used the tradi-
tional frames of notions. The UN Studio, FOA, or MVRDV
are not American-educated and they are engaged only with a
so-called multidisciplinary design theory which, moreover, be-
sides extensive construction practices, in the publications only
‘seems to be a theory’. For example, in connection with the
Yokohama port terminal, the FOA-chief Alejandro Zaera-Polo
no longer talks about ‘disciplinary reasons’ concerning forms,
but about the (multicultural) infrastructure of contexts and ar-
chitecture, about project management and technical feasibility:
that is a new kind of rationality clear to all.
Digital technique, which has become a fundamental condi-
tion for projects like this, seems to be indispensable on the one
hand to manage complexity-models, interconnect and operate
the multitude of information, change and dynamism, and on
the other hand, to realize theoretical—whether deconstructive
or pleated—concepts. For achieving these, high-end technical
background is necessary in both the architectural office and the
construction site, but the goal is not unconditionally to create a
‘technical building’ that is, by the way, already prescribed by to-
day’s global standards, or, often supposed by the ‘non-standard
attribute’. The real benefits are such complex geometries that
are able to project or manifest the idea of our complex contem-
porary world.
6Primarily: Cache B, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, (tr. Anne
Boyman), MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, and Lynn G, Folds, bodies & blobs:
collected essays, La Lettre Volee, Bruxelles, 1998.
0 Classical Critical Architecture – Basic Version of
Disciplinarity
The contemporary post-critical discourse, as the name sug-
gests, cannot be understood without the preceding critical tradi-
tion that has been building from the 1960s. This tradition—
although the young are referring to it as a counterpoint—is
arbitrarily-shaped, strong points of view have often been omit-
ted inexplicably and unjustifiably (for example, with the case of
Kenneth Frampton’s critical regionalism) or new ones are just
created (for example, in relation to the often-cited 1984 article
of K. Michael Hays).
Furthermore, the originally declared multi-level views around
the critical context of Oppositions, operated 1973-81, are
blurred. (It is sufficient here to mention only the specificity of
Eisenman, Frampton or Aldo Rossi.) The journal ‘for Ideas and
Criticism in Architecture’, and the Institute for Architecture and
Urban Studies (1967-1984) working behind it and led partly by
Eisenman, were positioned after modern architecture through its
assessment, especially by means of academic criticism. The re-
quest for a cross-disciplinary search can be traced back basically
to three inside factors. Firstly, functionalism and tabula rasa
became a dominating ideology that ended up in the homoge-
nization of the colourful modern tradition. Secondly, the radi-
cal modern form and method became ineffective by turning into
mass-production. Finally, the capitalism’s reduction of abstract
ideas to only measurability and ‘accountability’, which ‘thingi-
fication’ or ‘objectification’ is called reification in the Marxist
discourse, also became dominant in the field of architecture.
Although the critical need contrary to the previous trends can
be derived from the discipline, its background was built upon
more remote areas, since mostly European structuralist, phe-
nomenological and Marxist (Frankfurt School) intellectual re-
sources were imported or applied to architectural theory. Hence,
the voices in Oppositions debated with modernity, modernism
and also with each other, with the architectural interpretations
of the above, taking place far from practical life since, not inci-
dentally, the global economic recession of the era did not make
(experimental) buildings possible.
On the one hand, admitting the ‘inoperability’ of both the
revolutionary and the utopian-idealistic social changes, or the
avant-garde outbreaks, the total theoretical criticism, i.e. the
reflections of the mind, seemed to be a possible terrain for alter-
native solutions. On the other hand, since the culture industry
integrates immediately all counterpoints because an attempt to
change—that is criticism—defines itself in relation to the culture
industry, the existing system is further legitimized. The original
(critical) goal is becoming ineffective, even fashionable, and as
such is marketable, and soon turns into a mass-product.7 While
this model of negative dialectics had been created by Theodor
Adorno, the reference point of critical architecture would be
7A radical way can(not) be the terror as a critical response: neither the RAF-
group in Germany after 1968 nor the fundamentalism of the Millennium as a
consequence of the change of systems (the end of history).
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Manfredo Tafuri. Who, with the disappointment of 1968 in his
voice, applied the previous chain of thought, in fact declaring
the Last Judgment over modern architecture of which he criti-
cizes all directions, from industrial designers to avant-garde pi-
oneers, discovering only small results in their oeuvres. The only
acceptable peaks were a few Weimar / Vienna social housings
and the buildings of Mies van der Rohe in America. (More-
over, this will be taken over by Hays as well.) In summary:
resisting a mass culture maintained by the reign of capital, or
the avant-garde withdrawal conspiring in the bourgeois-elitist
boudoir, as Tafuri said, gives invalid responses. Hence, in the
discourse around Oppositions, withdrawal and internal critics
against it were present at the same time, while the approach of
social theories also has to have practical relevance in architec-
ture as a hospitality discipline, precisely because of its features.
That is why Eisenman and Koolhaas tried from the beginning,
to some extent, with theoretical foundations, to create a critical
practice and therefore could have become the Godfathers of the
young, unlike Frampton or Anthony Vidler of the same context
who, as historians or theorists, formed the discourse just from
‘outside’.
For the eighties, Eisenman immersed in the examination of
formal autonomy and the enrichment of theory with fiction de-
mystifying the Logos, while Koolhaas was in search of the
essence and sustainability of architecture in the typicality of
the metropolis and of mass culture. Both of them wanted to
continue—enlarge, reinterpret—the modern, while they had dif-
ferent ideas about the notion and the discipline itself. Eisen-
man’s time break aimed at the ‘real modernization’ of western
architecture within itself and springing from itself, thus trans-
forming disciplinary self-referential systems. Meanwhile, ac-
cording to the time break of Koolhaas, western architecture (his-
tory) came to an ‘end’ with the world-city formation process (as
an architectural ‘parallel universe’ is reached), and the blurring
of the boundaries of high and mass culture. Hence his criticism
can be understood from this non-architectural (non-canonized
historical) position. So Eisenman’s denial is manifested in his
radical introversion to disciplinarity (this is the purity of auton-
omy), and Koolhaas’ acts likewise, but in an opposite direc-
tion, turning outside (to the dirt of the market). Thus, the Eu-
ropean Koolhaas taking place in the framework of the American
mass-based or popular culture can be a post-modern architect-
alternative of the American Eisenman, who is taking place in
the framework of Europe-based high, academic or elite culture.8
The former ‘history of architecture’, differentiating within itself,
ends with this as its exclusivity is terminated, the effects have
also been widespread in practice, and the boundaries of canon
have been shifted.
In an artistic sense, the experimental (avant-garde) was in the
critical position with the mainstream facing it. However, in the
8It would be worth to expound on this transatlantic move, especially in con-
nection with Adorno (his cultural shock on emigrating to the U.S.) or Reyner
Banham (proposing Los Angeles as an alternative to the European city).
case of both architects, and of other members of Oppositions,
such ambivalence can be seen that (a social or temporal) com-
mitment always stands opposite (a formal or stylistic), striving
for autonomy. Eisenman deals only with form and gets rid of
any other ‘disciplinary exteriority’ in the name of criticizing the
modern, while Koolhaas, conversely, focuses only on these ex-
teriorities (on historicity) and wants to get rid of the shackles
of ‘disciplinary interiority’. (He did it only seemingly, because
while he wanted to forget the official canon, to continue the
American capitalist modern, he was citing from the canonical
Mies.)
In both cases, disciplinary criticism struggled to relieve the
(modernist) form of ideological background: Eisenman wanted
to be free from the materializing of function or machine aes-
thetic, as did Koolhaas of formalism of the author, so the
goal was common, only the methods leading toward it differed.
Eisenman, using post-structuralism and deconstruction—that is
the criticism of the criticism of modern (Western thinking)—
contests such an idea that all elements of a system can be
structured around a central principle or metaphysics. Accord-
ing to him, the philosophical attempts to dislocate former cen-
tres (God, Logos, Man, Arché, etc.) were followed by the ex-
periments of dislocating disciplinary dogmas, i.e. ideological
exteriorities. Koolhaas, with his ‘68-attitude and the desire for
liberation, rejects identity—as an invalid centre (received as a
ready-made sample from the fathers)—and talks about the typi-
cal mass instead of it, and so he does this with atypical modern
canon and the generic city instead of it. We should discuss these
issues today: whether it is possible to succeed in the removal
of the absolute centre of ideology, and if this criticism can exist
without an ideology (in other words, replacing ideology criti-
cally is not an inauguration of a newer ideology)?
1 To what extent can we move away from a descriptive
critical mode to a progressive, transformative mode for
architecture?
Besides the influences of the dynamism of the globalizing
economy, a general generational change can be assumed nat-
urally among the causes of pragmatic architecture: the means
of revolting against the (critical) old would be the overwrit-
ing of the critical attitude. However, this approach is ever so
much problematic. The turning against fathers continues partly
to be a ‘traditional’ critical position, partly it is extremely diffi-
cult to break out of Eisenman’s and Koolhaas’s very character-
istic schools, for which, moreover, a propensity rather appears
in relation to the former (of the theoretical and formalist au-
tonomy). Furthermore, it is not a recent discovery, that apply-
ing Tafuri’s normative ‘external’ historiography in practice is at
least questionable. From this perspective, there can be two kinds
of results. The new generation of architects would become ‘un-
derstanding’ (even self-critical!): they do not see themselves as
8Bernard Tschumi, in: Davidson, p. 229.
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philosophers or writers of social sciences, and in this sense they
do not lay claim to architectural and critical theory. Alterna-
tively, they would reject only the criticisms based on general ide-
ology and set up criticisms with individual perspectives instead
which can be connected to singular practical considerations and
can contribute to establish these.
In the following, therefore, partly refuting the concept of gen-
erational change, and searching for more sophisticated reasons
for pragmatism, we are going to examine an alternative from a
theoretical point of view, then the shifts in Godfathers’ oeuvres
themselves.
Although it is unclear whether the classical pragmatist princi-
ples may be topical today in the architectural field, John Dewey,
the former alternative to Marx, can be called to help to clarify
the relationship with critical architecture. Negative dialectics
claimed that in contrast to the promises of the Enlightenment—
the individual’s own intellectual freedom and égalité with
others—in modern capitalism and the media-dominated culture
industry, we are forced to believe that our needs are the same
and we follow ready-made models, we consume standardized
mass products, so that both individual thought and aesthetics be-
come inferior in seeking after the profit. But pragmatism thinks
positively and not in between extreme values. As Dewey’s ‘cre-
ative empiricism’ said, if the idea is obtained from the actual
experience then it is not ideology (i.e. previous methods) that
is forced into the present experience, hence the concept of truth
and democracy would be evolutionary and not have a general
relevance. (This can be referred to as case study-like.) Here
we are not guided by ready-received, closed concepts (national-
ism, identity, classes or other types), but by acceptance, individ-
ual freedom and responsibility: according to this individualism
there is no collective responsibility, because each individual is
transforming itself and thus is different. While Marxism as Eu-
ropean counter-politics acted against the accumulation of capi-
tal, and wanted to change social relations, just as utopian archi-
tects did, pragmatism stood up for classical capitalism, and lib-
eral democracy was an already given where, in a self-governing
society, the frames and rules must be constantly adapted. Nev-
ertheless, it is obvious that both sides are compromised for now:
the dialectic no longer has the critical/communist political coun-
terweight (because of all-engorging late capitalism), while on
the pragmatic side, liberal democracy began to deteriorate (for
the same reason, political power hid behind capital interest).
What is more, both Tafuri and Richard Rorty on the other side
talk about the futility of theory: in the former even withdrawing
is impossible, in the latter philosophy is unnecessary, its exis-
tence can be justified only as literary work.
Dewey was able to opt for pragmatism, but today’s architects,
as they declare, cannot do anything else. According to Dewey,
the truth of a thesis is guaranteed by its practical and operational
fulfilment, and this is in the future tense compared to the declar-
ing of the thesis. “The first projective architecture”, that was the
modern, acted like this, says Jeffrey Kipnis, namely in relation
to the future (and partly to utopia): it believed that, by an archi-
tecture embodying from a prior idea, a better (social) system can
be created.9 Yet, contemporary pragmatist architects are talking
about such a projection, which would refer to the present: this
real-time planning, on the one hand, would mean a simultaneous
happening with thinking up the idea, on the other hand, it would
transform directly the actual. Compared to the presentness of
the building, the idea (and the drawing representing it) always
belonged to the past, but now, as pragmatists say, compared to
the plan (and to the diagram), with the assistance for example of
file-to-factory or rapid prototyping methods, the back and forth
effect is immediate. That is why the actuality of projection has
no place for ideological criticism and theory, because—in fact
following Dewey—(architectural) thinking needs to be instru-
mentalized, as the UN Studio and others claimed heading for
2000.10 The “architecture as social discursive practice” abol-
ishes the totality of the ideology—taken by the architect—that
the decisions in the complex design process, in a specific sce-
nario, can be consensus-based. Moreover, it can be seen that in
this multi-aspect course of negotiation-series some sort of crit-
ical interest, besides economic, technical or urbanist, can also
be represented: only the exclusivity of criticism in the design is
questionable. (It should be noted however, that from the tradi-
tional critical viewpoint, it is rather strange and even unaccept-
able that within the pragmatist architecture, the overall welfare
of individuals would be achieved exactly by the capital—namely
lining up the technological, i.e. digital, progress.)
Critical architecture, with the leadership of Godfather Eisen-
man, also responds to complex problems. Dialectics should not
be regarded as operated by simply the totalization of black and
white (reduced and fixed) opposites, but as adapting poles—
capable of development, or even (self)-contradictory—to indi-
vidual cases, and all this would not only be interpreted within
the architectural history, as it has been done by Tafuri. There-
fore, linguistic (Fredric Jameson), sociological (Saskia Sassen)
or gender (Elizabeth Grosz) terrains are introduced into the dis-
course of ANY, where dialectics constantly pops up in the ‘fight
against oppression’, giving further samples to the maintenance
of critical architecture. Along the idea of dynamic difference
and the method of dynamic dialectics, it can be stated that the
extremes of criticism cannot exist without each other, as they are
defined in relation to something, and their meaning is constantly
changing consequently by current frame and divider boundary,
modifying simultaneously the discipline’s meaning of the time.
However, in an ambivalent way, Eisenman emphasizes the
misty concept of architectural ‘expertise’ and the operations of
‘problematizing’ in the turn of the Millennium. The former sets
itself against interdisciplinarity and urges the discourse of ar-
chitects among each other since the direct links between idea
and realization, and the operation of projection still remains in-
9Steele, pp. 59-60.
10van Berkel, B & Bos, C, Diagrams. Interactive instruments in operation,
ANY Magazine (1998), no. 23, pp. 19-25.
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visible. Eisenman’s example is the latent relationship between
Koolhaas’ ‘virtuoso’ buildings and the research projects preced-
ing them. The same will be true for the young, despite the
multitude of their quasi-theoretical books and also for Eisen-
man himself. The concept can be understood generally, but its
motives and embodiment hardly. The other problem with the
late-Eisenman, is that he still does not want to solve problems
but to theorize them. Unfortunately, what is understandable as
an artistic-theoretical project cannot be achieved in the practical
terrain; a solution must be produced here as the young prag-
matists (the competitors!) often provide a number of different
alternatives.
Eisenman as an analyst puts the spectacle (the Bilbao
Guggenheim) into one pole of contemporary criticism of which
the antithesis are the libraries of Koolhaas11 and Michael
Haneke-films12, because in both the viewer has an active, self-
governing role, just like at Dewey’s theory. Today’s image-like
buildings and reality-like movies make the imagination lazy:
following Adorno, they do not create and convey (artistic) val-
ues, therefore they do not make the viewer think, which would
be the active perception, but they make money and entertain as
part of the culture industry, shifting the viewer into passivity.
Even if this is true, films (as artworks) can be appreciated as a
confrontation of the passive Hollywood-viewer with itself, in the
case of buildings, assuming this kind of generative operations,
they have much more problems.
Meanwhile, in the example of the Euralille-project, criticism
against president François Mitterand’s state-desire for monu-
mentalism was to be achieved by the ‘uncritical acceptance’
of the—average, banal and typical, i.e. character-free—urban
environment in the interpretation of Godfather Koolhaas. Ac-
cordingly, the question of autonomy in architecture is ‘overesti-
mated’ because the architect, in a certain sense, is in a passive,
dependent, powerless position, even if he or she has own inten-
tions or visions unlike Hollywood-viewers. We have no choice,
as Koolhaas says: in order to handle complexity, somehow it is
necessary to get over his own legacy of ‘68 and that “the only
respectable position is a critical position[...] It is impossible to
make a creative statement that is based purely on criticism“. 13
In the whole discourse and with Koolhaas as well, it is a with-
held fact that ‘complexity’ is infinite and uncontrollable, thus it
includes failure, which is not allowed in the history of an invest-
ment. So ‘experimentation’ is possible only among controlled
conditions. The other ambivalence concerning Koolhaas’ propo-
sition is that he claims that the reason of why we must get rid of
the ballast of place, historicity or criticism is because they are in
the way of ‘creativity’. Although the young will have a propen-
sity for referring to this line of thought later, neither here nor
11Steele, pp. 27.
12See Eisenman P,Michael Haneke and the New Subjectivity, in: Grundmann
124-129. and Bun Z, Peter Eisenman és a vér nélküli horror, Debreceni Disputa
(2009), no. 10. és 11-12.
13Davidson, p. 234.
there is it clear (in contrast to Dewey) what the notion envelops
and why is that so prominent at the turn of the millennium. It
can be guessed as much that it does not have much to do with
the ‘pragmatic’ creation of the singular-saleable market-product
and its communication (that is advertising).
2 Towards a 3P architectural practice?
The young use the 3P notions—pragmatism, projection and
performativity—to redefine the frames of the discipline. The
latter of the three is the result of projectivity: it would have
direct effects, so architecture would ‘come to life’ either liter-
ally (by interactive technological experiments) or in an abstract
(Haneke-like) sense. Interestingly, both the older and the young
forget about the performativity of the Derridean deconstruction:
about the acting of writing, the textuality of the text that it is not
only content but also a structural, formal, or even a pragmatic
game. Critics eliminated the direct, everyday relevance of lan-
guage games (being fascinated by the transformation of the in-
ternal elements of architectural discipline), and pragmatists did
the same with the intellectual and lyrical truth of the approach
(by their revolutionary desire for technical novelty).
While Michael Hays in 1982 claimed that critical architecture
is in an exceptional position between “being a cultural prod-
uct” and the autonomous value, then Robert Somol and Sarah
Whiting state that “all architecture now automatically occupies
a de facto critical status” in 2002.14 This premise says that
the critical practice has become ordinary, as high culture has
been dissolved in the ‘over-aesthetized’ everyday life, therefore
this easy criticism differs from the dialectical one, meanwhile
none of the extremes, neither autonomy nor the individual—thus
uninteresting—lightness are a passable way. Here, the disci-
plinarity reserved as instrumentality is proposed again, which is
diagrammatic, atmospheric and cool, and contrasts with the hot
avant-garde revolution and dialectics. It is not based on textu-
ality and on operations prescribing meaning, but on the design
method and its effects. The notion of discipline is not strongly
defined and finite, but ‘under defined’, active and discursive: the
meaning is emerged in relation to context and viewer. This in-
terpretative approach can be the extension of Eisenmanian au-
tonomy to the other senses: it is not only optical, say Whiting
and Somol, but it influences many more domains. It is not just
reading, but “atmospheric interaction”. The other factors enter-
ing beside formal (disciplinary) understanding or perception are
developed from the viewers’ lived experiences by their “repeti-
tion, coincidence or duplication”. However, it is not discussed
whether the architects are aware of these processes, how can a
building be designed for the singular experiences of a viewer
(even for ‘all viewers’), or how the cool concept can work in
practice. It is also not declared by Somol and Whiting that the
main difference between hot and cool discipline is that it was
the academic viewpoint of the architect (the critique of ideol-
14Somol, pp. 73.
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ogy) that was dislocated earlier, since the critical projects also
had the freedom of interpretation, but by 3P-methods, the dis-
location of the viewpoint of people on the street (the subject’s
active self-criticism in lack of ideology) is preplanned.
The ‘post-critical architecture’ is proclaimed almost a trend
by Michael Speaks: his classification is based on the manage-
rial approach of young Dutch with which complexity and reifi-
cation would be handled (i.e. managed), and globalized capi-
talism would be interpreted as a new possibility instead of an
enemy. Speaks’ slogan is ‘design intelligence’: let the archi-
tectural office work like the CIA, get as many little truths from
as many areas as can be available increasingly approaching the
mystery of the great complexity. Its tool would be the research,
he says, which can liberate the architecture from being an artis-
tic expression.15 But the notion of ’research’ and its relation-
ship with architecture is unclear, so it is questionable whether
the alleged objectivity of research may substitute for the criti-
cal background. Architecture should be protected from being a
purely statistical incarnation, however Speaks fails to see, even
with his favourite Dutch, the attempts to do so: UN Studio be-
came self-critical, transforming its design methodology when
early attempts to design from pure databases had resulted in me-
chanical, even sterile end-products.
The key in the eyes of Speaks is innovation linked to the
already mentioned ‘creativity’, while such issues like space,
originality or the search for the new, and the idea of problem-
solving, would disappear. While Eisenman announced an infi-
nite, process-like approach facing the discontinuous and ‘franti-
cally seeking for a new’ attitude of the modern, Koolhaas pre-
ferred the typicality of the skyscraper, then the generic features
of the metropolis and suburb to the atypical and pre-eminent
examples of architectural history. Or so did Lynn—in his natu-
ral parallels—with the unique (asymmetrical, disproportionate,
distorted) morphology reacting to environmental influences on
the assumption of generality (i.e. the species) and its oppressor-
evolutionary theory. In Speaks’ opinion, this sounds as the fol-
lowing:
“while problem solving works within a given paradigm to cre-
ate solutions to known problems, innovation risks working with
existent but unknown conditions in order to discover opportuni-
ties that could not have been predicted in advance”16.
Are they not all talking about the same, just from philosoph-
ical, urban, biological and technological points of view? That
there is never either clear origin or tabula rasa but there is always
a multitude of antecedents and random effects? That although a
so-called (end-)product is produced for the market, it is part of
the constant and consistent development of the architectural of-
15In proof he recalls Patrik Schumacher, although it can hardly be argued that
the works of the Zaha Hadid-office today would be less form-centric than ten
years ago. It is true that the office is well managed, but this is much less to
do with ‘research-based design’ than with Hadid’s genius or the professional
digitizing of representation.
16Speaks, (2002), pp. 6.
fice? Thus, neither theory nor (technological) innovation can
exist without criticism, but its driving force, background and
means are continually modified.
The proposal that rejects both the extremes of autonomy and
the Speaks-like pragmatism defining itself in relation to them, is
made by Reinhold Martin as a kind of utopian realism. It claims
that pragmatism equates “political critique (as adumbrated by
historians and theorists like Tafuri)“ with “aesthetic critique (as
adumbrated by architects like Eisenman)“ blurring the critical
theory of the Frankfurt School and architectural ambition for
autonomy17. The self-contradiction and confusion of the young
can be perceived not only about Koolhaas considering him as
their Godfather while forgetting his Paranoid Critical Method
of Delirious New York, but also about Gilles Deleuze as their
intellectual leader whose position, however, was the same for
the late critical-autonomous side. Moreover, as Martin rightly
points out, the French oeuvre gets to the proximity of 3P archi-
tecture through multiple transmissions and twisting its original
intentions. In addition, the roots of the philosopher are linked
to European counter-culture while the architects’ are rather to
contemporary capitalist America. Martin says, therefore, the 3P
can be understood as a pilot episode of making an all-out ef-
fort to destruct the dialectical idea of radical politics, that is of
any alternatives, by aestheticization. Maybe we should not give
such power into the hands of the young pragmatists, but it can be
stated that their deliberate blurring of sources, ideas or goals—
all against rigid dialectics—has the great danger of revving the
engorging feature of capitalism up even more. Deleuze did
not only offer a singular attitude for the consumer deluded and
grown increasingly comfortable by the culture industry, but he
also represented it. He was critical by not accepting any frame
(textual formats, disciplinary canons, etc.), and he was imma-
nent within his own body of thought, which, becoming rhi-
zomatically extended, came into fashion generally, and also in
the field of architecture, as such a phenomenon against which
it had taken steps. Indeed, in losing its singularity and essence
it ’authorizes’ us to arbitrariness and uncritical acceptance. If
we oversimplify the process: by the time a building has been
materialized from the folding theory, nomadology and other
philosophical concepts—since we should have no doubt about
architects fiercely referring to these in relation to the design—
Deleuze’s flexible line of thought turns into the merging image
of the world as a standardized connecting-metaphor, and this
model will operate both the discipline and the role of the archi-
tect.
3 Backwards from topography
As seen above, today’s architectural thinking is character-
ized by confusion. On the one hand, the fuzzy images of ac-
tion and reaction, reason and criticism cannot be distinguished.
The model of criticism, which has always worked as distanc-
17Martin, pp. 106.
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ing, as setting up a frame, as a division in two, seems to be
replaced by hybrids and networks. On the other hand, the tra-
ditional enlightening goal—endowing the proletariat with equal
rights, then the emancipation of Blacks or women, and most re-
cently of the ‘ex-third world’—is turned inside out, becoming
at the same time the means of a global capitalism supposed to
be a norm or a common frame. The critical-resistant theories
of Derrida and Deleuze were compromised along the idea of
equal opportunity just like this, and so was the critical-complex
architecture set up against a simplifying modernism. The archi-
tecture of deconstruction and then of folding, on the one hand,
have become a formal manner (folded simplicity) or a topologi-
cal bubble (mathematically complex surface), on the other hand
it takes into account even less that disadvantages and negatives
are also part of the ‘free system’. The architect(-artist) can af-
ford to explore and risk complexity, but the politician and the in-
vestor ultimately cannot, as he needs a clear and positive image
and is often interested only in profit. The difference can be well-
illustrated by the transformation of Coop Himmelb(l)au: while
in 1968 their iconoclastic manifests called the lack of confusion
and uncertainty to account on architecture, today their tottering
forms are sold in series worldwide with an (image of) extraordi-
nary self-confidence.
Fig. 1.
In this uncertainty, the boundaries of the discipline are also
questionable, but as it can be seen in the outlined discourse,
they spread between the poles of criticism and pragmatism.
With the assistance of modernity—i.e. removing the external
fixed coordinate or background systems like grand narratives
or styles—unambiguous extremes have ceased in architecture
as well, or rather thousands of individual points of view (that
is moving coordinates) have been put forward. These are in-
cluded in the topographic model, in which in-betweenness so
is. It contains the ‘other’ layers of contradictions, its dialectic is
dynamic. (In other words, Deleuze has become popular because
he did not recommend ’dialectical’, but topographic criticism.)
While post-critics speak about the end of resistance, the ques-
tion is rather that the change of enemy and the transformation
of the way of resistance are happening simultaneously. More-
over, pragmatism can be understood as ideology, see Dewey, in
the same way as the rigid Tafurian critical project. The return of
explicit social sensitivity and responsibility, the gender-culture
or the defence of the natural environment cannot provide an ‘al-
ternative solution’ as they are unable to eradicate the greed of
capital, but they can give the critical methods a try. If the disci-
pline is not static, if it is constantly adjusting its frames (its co-
ordinate systems) instead of dividing itself between interiorities
and exteriorities, relevant and effective responses can be made
following these topics and the discipline’s own traditions. And
since the theory is the domain which is not necessarily interested
in the capital, its continuation is in key position.18
Fig. 2.
The topographic model can operate at several—
methodological (diagrammatic), formal (material), functional
(role of architect)—levels besides the theoretical-critical one,
however this article specializes only in the latter. Even though,
for example, a topographic (landscape-like) building form can
be interpreted as the criticism of monumental or representative
architecture. Criticism is considered here, instead of the
generally accepted terms of commentary, as an interpretative
field: as a reflection of myself and others, both in text and on
the street. Maybe the critical consideration makes up only a few
percent of the complex architectural design, but if the latter is
regarded as a topological spline—extendable to a surface—and
the former as the inflection point of the curve, the change in
the boundaries of criticality will affect the behaviour of the
whole curve or surface (and vice versa: the critical position
must also evolve following the other factors.) Thus topography
is not licentiousness, but a regulated linkage: a 2.0 version of
disciplinarity (i.e. architectural specificity). It assumes the
general problem of modernity and the architectural theory as
18The exception is the kind of university research that is strictly technical in
nature and requires resources from outside: from the market.
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becoming extensive almost parallel with it, the first reactions
created as a consequence of and with the help of these, and
also that the model is not perfect and definitive, but is to be
continuously developed.
By naming the term, the intention is not to make it norma-
tive, but rather to describe a situation where pragmatism is not
born in the duality of high culture / elite theory and its opposite,
the everyday / mass / pop, but between the two. Topography is
rather a symptom of the era than a proposed programme, rather a
question and not a classification: it does not urge steps ‘towards
a topographic architecture’, but it is stepping slowly backwards
by exploring the contemporary background and leitmotifs in or-
der to look for the place of the discipline today.
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